
























zur Zukunft der Arbeit
Institute for the Study 
of Labor 
Back to the Future: Decomposition Analysis of
Distributive Policies Using Behavioural Simulations
IZA DP No. 5226
September 2010
Olivier Bargain 
Back to the Future: 
Decomposition Analysis of Distributive 





University College Dublin, Geary Institute, 













P.O. Box 7240   
53072 Bonn   
Germany   
 
Phone: +49-228-3894-0  







Any opinions expressed here are those of the author(s) and not those of IZA. Research published in 
this series may include views on policy, but the institute itself takes no institutional policy positions. 
 
The Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in Bonn is a local and virtual international research center 
and a place of communication between science, politics and business. IZA is an independent nonprofit 
organization supported by Deutsche Post Foundation. The center is associated with the University of 
Bonn and offers a stimulating research environment through its international network, workshops and 
conferences, data service, project support, research visits and doctoral program. IZA engages in (i) 
original and internationally competitive research in all fields of labor economics, (ii) development of 
policy concepts, and (iii) dissemination of research results and concepts to the interested public.  
 
IZA Discussion Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion. 
Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be 












Back to the Future: Decomposition Analysis of Distributive 
Policies Using Behavioural Simulations
* 
 
For policy makers and analysts, it is important to isolate the redistributive impact of tax-
benefit policy changes from changes in the environment in which policies operate. When 
actual reforms are motivated by work incentives, it is also crucial to evaluate behavioural 
responses and the distributional consequences thereof. For that purpose, we embed 
counterfactual simulations in a formal framework based on the Shapley value decomposition 
and quantify the relative roles of (i) tax-benefit policy changes (direct policy effect), (ii) labour 
supply responses to the policy reforms (indirect effect) and (iii) all other factors affecting 
income distribution over time. An application to the UK shows that the redistributive reforms 
of the 1998-2001 period have offset the increase in inequality that would have occurred 
otherwise. They also contribute to a strong decline in child poverty and poverty amongst 
single parent households. In the latter group, a third of the headcount poverty reduction (and 
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apply. 1 Introduction
The decomposition of di⁄erences in household income distributions across countries or
over time has received renewed attention in the recent years. For instance, some authors
have relied on the micro-simulation of household behaviour to extend the simple frame-
work of Mincer￿ s wage regression model to additional factors like changes in occupational
status or household composition (see Bourguignon et al., 2001, 2007, Hyslop and MarØ,
2004).1 Importantly, these techniques overcome some of the limitations of traditional ap-
proaches like the decomposition by subgroup or by income sources (see Cowell, 1998, for
an overview). They refer to the distribution as a whole and isolate the e⁄ects of particular
variables in a well-de￿ned way thanks to counterfactual simulations. In contrast, decom-
positions by subgroup are often con￿ned to inequality/poverty indices with particular
decomposability properties and su⁄er from the fact that the e⁄ects of correlated variables
cannot be disentangled in the necessarily coarse population partitions used in practice.
Similar limitations apply to the traditional decomposition of inequality indices by
income components when trying to isolate the role of taxes or social transfers (Shorrocks,
1982). Firstly, conventional procedures often place constraints on the types of poverty and
inequality indices which can be used. Some indices require the introduction of a vaguely
de￿ned ￿ interaction￿term in order to maintain the decomposition identity. Secondly, they
do not allow disentangling the pure e⁄ect of policy changes from their interaction with
the underlying population. For instance, they cannot identify whether an increase in
social assistance income is due to increased generosity of bene￿t payments or from an
automatic increase in the incidence of transfers as unemployment rises.2 Counterfactual
scenarios obtained by tax-bene￿t microsimulation techniques can be used to overcome
these limitations. They allow analyzing changes of the disposable income distribution
as a whole (instead of focusing on speci￿c aggregate measures) and make it possible to
disentangle the pure e⁄ect of a policy change from changes in the environment in which
the policy operates, and in particular changes in market income inequality. While the
1This type of approach is computationally demanding, which explains why decompositions of di⁄er-
ences in the household income distributions are not so frequent, at least compared to those concerning
the distribution of wages (for instance the many extensions of the Oaxaca￿ Blinder approach to the whole
wage distribution following the seminal work of Juhn et al., 1993, and DiNardo et al., 1996).
2The approach sometimes referred to as the ￿ actual payments￿method is used by Jenkins (1995) and
Goodman et al. (1997) to analyse inequality trends in the UK. Their ￿nding that the tax-bene￿t system
of the late 1980s was not less redistributive than that of the late 1970s is partly due to the fact that
they do not account for changes in the underlying market income distribution. Jenkins indicates that
decomposition results di⁄er when used with di⁄erent inequality indices, especially when the indices are
sensitive to extreme income observations.
1number of policy studies using these techniques is growing exponentially,3 counterfactual
simulations are rarely embedded in a formal decomposition framework. Yet quantifying
the relative e⁄ect of tax-bene￿t policy changes on inequality/poverty trends is all the more
important as this factor, among all factors in￿ uencing household income distribution, is
directly relevant to policy makers.
Recently, Bargain and Callan (2008) have suggested a decomposition based on Shorrocks
(1999)￿ s reinterpretation of the Shapley value decomposition and on the construction of
suitable counterfactual distributions.4 This decomposition relies on static policy e⁄ects,
however. Actual reforms are motivated by labour supply incentives, as was the case in
the UK with the introduction of the Working Families Tax Credit (WFTC) in 1999.
Addressing behavioural e⁄ects is therefore important when such motivations are part
of the policy measure. In countries like the UK, work incentives are higher up on the
agenda when discussing distributional e⁄ects of tax-bene￿t policies, especially for certain
groups characterized by both high risks of poverty and low employment rates (e.g., single
mothers). Against this background, the present note suggests estimating labour supply
behaviour to extend the Shorrocks-Shapley decomposition to three factors: (i) direct ef-
fect of tax-bene￿t policy changes, (ii) indirect e⁄ect due to the labour supply responses
to these policies and (iii) all other e⁄ects a⁄ecting the income distribution. Note that
the measurement of policy impacts may depend on the underlying population used to
evaluate policy changes and behaviour, either the base-period or the ￿nal-period data.
The Shorrocks-Shapley decomposition method essentially involves averaging over these
cases, but it is possible to examine the potential sensitivity of results to this issue. This
is of particular interest when, for example, attempting to assess potential/future policy
changes, for which end-period data are by de￿nition not available.5
3These studies focus on the distributional impact of tax-bene￿t reforms using static simulations (e.g.,
Decoster and Van-Camp, 2001) or behavioural simulations (e.g., Aaberge al., 1995, Creedy and Kalb,
2005). They may analyse the redistributive potential of existing systems (e.g., Fuest et al., 2009) or of
hypothetical reforms like a ￿ at tax system (e.g., Fuest et al., 2008).
4The general Shorrocks-Shapley decomposition method has been applied in several contexts, including
the decomposition of changes in inequality trends (see Mookherjee and Shorrocks, 1982, for the UK and
Cowell and Jenkins, 1995, for the US, or more recently Peichl et al., 2009, for Germany), in poverty trends
(into components due to income growth and to inequality, as for instance in Kolenikov and Shorrocks,
2005) and in income mobility indices (see van Kerm, 2004).
5This issue has been investigated in the literature on tax progressivity (see Lambert and Thoresen,
2009, for a recent investigation) but has received less attention in policy evaluations (an exception is
Clark and Leicester, 2004). Jenkins and van Kerm (2005) analyse inequality changes in the UK in the
1980s and discuss the choice of weights used in the decomposition, either base-period values, end-period
values or the Shapley value.
2Our empirical application revisits the role of tax-bene￿t policies implemented in the
UK over 1998-2001. This period is particularly interestingly for several reasons.6 Firstly,
this corresponds to a time of economic upturn accompanied by an increase in market
income inequality. It also coincides with the ￿rst term of the New Labour government
(1997-2001) characterized by a series of very important welfare reforms. In addition,
several reforms, like the WFTC, were intended to increase ￿nancial incentives to work.
Our results show that these policy changes have just o⁄set the rise in inequality that
would have occur without them. Policy reforms are also the main contributor to a strong
decline in child poverty and poverty amongst single parent households. In the latter
group, a third of the headcount poverty reduction (and half of the reduction in the depth
of poverty) is on account of the strong incentive e⁄ects of policy reforms.
The layout of this note is as follows. Section 2 presents the decomposition approach.
Section 3 describes the data, the simulation model, the labour supply estimation and the
empirical results. Section 4 concludes.
2 Shapley Decomposition with Behavioural Responses
We ￿rst introduce some notation and terminology. Matrix y describes the population
contained in the data, i.e., each row contains all the information about a given household
(various income sources and socio-demographic characteristics). Denote d the ￿ tax-bene￿t
function￿transforming, for each household, gross incomes and household characteristics
into a certain level of equivalised disposable income.7 Tax-bene￿t calculations depend
also on a set of monetary parameters p (e.g., maximum bene￿t amounts, threshold level
of tax brackets, etc.). Thus, the distribution of disposable income is represented hereafter
by di(pj;yl), for a hypothetical scenario including the population of year l, the tax-bene￿t
parameters of year j and the tax-bene￿t structure of year i. In the empirical part, we shall




of the (simulated) distribution of disposable income.8 Policy changes under study possibly
6See the companion paper Bargain (2009) for a static decomposition and for an analysis of alternative
uprating factors used to assess the policy e⁄ect in the UK.
7We denote by household ￿ gross income￿or ￿ market income￿the total amount of labour income, capital
income and private pensions before taxes and bene￿ts. ￿ Disposable income￿is the household income that
remains after payment of taxes/social contributions and receipt of all transfers, as widely used to measure
poverty and inequality. We consider that the link between contributions and the value of bene￿ts is loose
enough in the UK so that earnings-replacement incomes provided by the state (job seeker￿ s allowance,
basic pension, disability bene￿ts) can be treated as part of the redistribution function.
8These measures allow writing the decomposition in a simple and clear way. Yet, as stated in the
introduction, we are not con￿ned to speci￿c indices with particular decomposability properties and could
3combine changes in policy structure d and changes in parameters p (the ￿ uprating policy￿ ).
Next, we consider the possibility of constructing counterfactual scenarios. To apply the
tax-bene￿t system of year 1 on data of year 0, we must nominally adjust income levels by
the uprating factor ￿1, i.e., the income growth rate between year 0 and year 1. This leads
to the counterfactual distribution d1(p1;￿1y0) where ￿1y0 retains the structural charac-
teristics of the population in year 0 (in particular the wage distribution and labour supply
choices) but adopts the nominal (market) income levels prevailing in year 1. Symmetri-
cally, we may evaluate the distribution obtained with the initial policy applied to the new
population. Yet a measure d0(p0;y1) would not be consistent since base-period parame-
ters would be arti￿cially applied to end-period income levels. For instance, previous tax
band thresholds would be applied to new and possibly higher income levels, thereby gen-
erating arti￿cial ￿ ￿scal drag￿(see Immervoll, 2005). Hence tax-bene￿t parameters must
be uprated using the same factor ￿1 as used to scale up the distribution of market income
between years 0 and 1. This yields the counterfactual d0(￿1p0;y1) where the nominally
adjusted tax-bene￿t parameters ￿1p0 di⁄er from the actual set of parameters p1 in force
in year 1.9
We are interested in characterizing the total change ￿ in the inequality/poverty index














Let us ￿rst consider the decomposition without behavioural e⁄ects. The ￿ can be de-
composed into the contribution of the change in the tax-bene￿t policy (￿ policy e⁄ect￿ )
and the contribution of changes in the underlying population (￿ other e⁄ects￿ ). The for-
mer component corresponds to a shift from d0(p0;￿) to d1(p1;￿) while the latter is simply
a move from base year data y0 to ￿nal data y1. Thus the decomposition consists in a
shift in data conditional on the initial policy, followed by a change in policy evaluated
on ￿nal data (decomposition 1). Or, alternatively and symmetrically, a change in pol-
icy evaluated on base year data, followed by a change in underlying data conditional on
the new policy (decomposition 2). In these decompositions, we must be careful to use
produce decompositions results for the whole distribution.
9In practice, the backdrop used to evaluate the actual uprating policy is often based on price in￿ ation.
However, Clark and Leicester (2004) show that this actually captures only part of the uprating practices
of the past decades in the UK. A benchmark based on earnings growth is recommended by several authors
as the appropriate one for the purpose of evaluating the distributional e⁄ect of policies as compared to
other changes in underlying data. Indeed, it is the only one that provides a "distributionally-neutral"
backdrop (Callan et al., 2006) or "constant progressivity" counterfactual (Clark and Leicester, 2004)
against which actual policy changes can be evaluated. See the extensive discussion in Bargain (2009).
4(a) nominally-adjusted tax-bene￿t parameters ￿1p0 when simulating the old policy on
the new data y1 and (b) nominally-adjusted market income ￿1y0 when applying the new




















































The ￿rst term captures the e⁄ect of the tax-policy change conditional on ￿nal year data.
Conditional on the policy structure of year 0, and for nominal levels of year 1, the second
term gauges the other changes in the underlying population (ex: labour supply adjustment
to the policy over the period, changes in wage inequality, demographics, etc.). Symmet-




















































with the end-period policy evaluated on nominally-adjusted base-period data.
In both decompositions, the last term simply captures the e⁄ect of nominally adjusting
base-year data. If the tax-bene￿t system is linear and continuous in p and y, which is
the case in many countries including the UK, a simultaneous change in nominal levels of
both incomes and parameters should not a⁄ect the relative location of households in the






and the last term of the decompositions should be zero. We shall test this linear homogeneity
property empirically but assume for now that it holds in order to simplify the following
notations.
Next, we acknowledge the fact that changes in tax-bene￿t policies may induce labour
supply responses and hence an indirect (but possibly intended) e⁄ect on the distribution
of market income. Denote yl
k the population of year l making labour supply choices as
if living under the policy regime k. That is, we can estimate a behavioural model on
base-period data and simulate the market incomes of the base-period population after
adjustment to the new policy (y0
1) or, inversely, estimate the model on end-period data
and simulate the market incomes under the "old" policy (y1
0). We are free to construct all
types of counterfactuals, for instance a distribution di(pi;yl
k) for the population of year l
5under the policy of year i and with labour supply choices adjusted to the policy of year k.
The situations where labour supply is static, i.e., yl
k with k = l, are those used in previous
decompositions and simply written yl to simplify notations. Then, we can account for the
three e⁄ects (policy, behaviour, other) which give nine permutations and in principle nine
decompositions. In fact, the "other e⁄ects" and behavioural e⁄ects must be positioned
consecutively since they correspond to a split of the former "other e⁄ects" in primary
decompositions 1 and 2. Hence we have only four decompositions. In the ￿rst two, labour
supply behaviour is estimated on base-period data and the behavioural e⁄ect is simulated














































































































In the two next decompositions, labour supply is estimated on end-period data and the










































































































As argued by Shorrocks (1999), the Shapley value procedure can be employed whenever
one wishes to assess the relative importance of the explanatory variables. In particular,
the decomposition of a poverty/inequality statistic I can be carried out by considering the
marginal e⁄ect on I of eliminating each of the contributory factors in sequence, and then
assigning to each factor the average of its marginal contributions in all possible elimination
sequences. In particular, the direct policy e⁄ect under the Shapley decomposition is
6obtained by averaging the contributions from the four decompositions set out above.






































3.1 Data, Labour Supply Model and Simulations
The base and end period data are drawn from the Family Expenditure Surveys (FES)
and contain 6;797 and 6;637 households respectively. The uprating factor ￿1, calcu-
lated as the growth rate of average gross income over the 1998-2001 period, is 6:8%. It
is computed as an average of all market incomes (incl. labour income, capital incomes
and private pensions). Tax-bene￿t simulations of disposable income are performed for
all the representative households of each dataset using the tax-bene￿t calculator EURO-
MOD. The robustness of these simulations is extensively discussed in Bargain (2009).10
Household disposable income is equivalised using the modi￿ed OECD scale and poverty
measures rely on a poverty line ￿xed at 60% of the median equivalised income.
Labour supply is estimated (and behavioural responses predicted) on three selected
subgroups of base- and end-period data separately. In each sample, we keep households
where adults are aged between 18 and 59 and available for the labour market, i.e., neither
disabled nor retired nor in education. The self-employed and farmers are excluded as
their labour supply decisions are probably very di⁄erent from those of salary workers.
The selected samples drawn from the base-period (resp. end-period) data comprise 2;020
couples, 740 single women and 424 single men (resp. 1;849, 774 and 442).
We rely on a discrete choice model of household labour supply (multinomial logit).
The approach has become relatively standard and we refer to Aaberge et al. (2005) or
Blundell et al. (2000) for a detailed exposition. The model is based on the assumption





ij ;Cij) + ￿ij:
with spouses￿worked hours H
f
ij, Hm
ij for that particular choice j and the corresponding
level of disposable income Cij (equivalent to household consumption in such a static
framework). Each discrete bundle of working time and disposable income provides a
10It would be interesting to study a longer period. This was not possible using the current version
of EUROMOD as both policy and data are required at each period. Nonetheless, the important policy
changes in 1998-2001 make this period worth focusing on.
7di⁄erent level of utility so that leisure-consumption preferences, once parameterized, can
be estimated by maximization among a discrete set of possibilities j = 1;:::J. In fact, an
explicit logistic formfor the probability of choosing option j is derived from the assumption
that random terms ￿ij are i.i.d. and follow a EV-I distribution, so that the model can
be estimated by maximum likelihood. We use the same speci￿cation as Blundell et al.
(2000), with a quadratic form for the utility function U, ￿xed costs of work, coe¢ cients
varying with taste-shifters (age, family composition, region) and random components.
We discretize household budget constraints with J = 4 choices (0;20;40 and 50 hours per
week) for singles and the 16 combinations for couples ￿results do not change signi￿cantly
with a thinner discretization. The tax-bene￿t simulator is used to predict disposable




and other household characteristics. Wages wf and wm are calculated using observed
earnings and work hours for workers and are predicted for non-workers. Because the
model is nonlinear, we take the wage rate prediction errors explicitly into account for a
consistent estimation. Both types of disturbance terms (random preferences and the wage
error term) are integrated out in the likelihood, practically by summing over a tractable
number of draws (see Train 2003).
We summarize important information concerning the labour supply estimations in
table 1, namely goodness-of-￿t measures and labour supply elasticities (detailed estimates
of the model are also available from the author). The ￿t of the model is reasonably good
and in line with previous results in the literature (see Blundell and MaCurdy, 1999).
Elasticities are obtained by simulating the impact of a marginal increase in gross hourly
wages on hours of work and participation.11 Results show usual results: elasticities are
more precisely estimated for couples than for single individuals, are essentially driven
by the extensive (participation) margin, are smallest for married men and particularly
large for single mothers (see also recent results for the UK in Blundell et al., 2000, 2009).
Elasticities decrease over time and especially for the latter group, which is characteristic
of the increased in labour market participation of lone mothers over the period. We also
￿nd negative and notably smaller cross-wage elasticities for married men and women and
income elasticities not signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero (not reported).
11Elasticities (and the policy e⁄ects discussed in the next sub-section) are predicted by a calibration
method which is consistent with the probabilistic nature of the model at the individual level. It consists
of drawing from a EV ￿ I distribution series of pseudo-residuals ￿ij (j = 1;::J) for each household
that generate a perfect match between predicted and observed choices. The same draws are kept when
predicting labour supply responses to a shock on the budget constraint (wages increase or tax-bene￿t
policy reform). Averaging individual supply responses over a large number of draws provides robust
transition matrices. Con￿dence intervals are obtained by repetitive random draws of the preference
parameters from their estimated distributions and, for each draw, by applying the calibration procedure.
83.2 Tax-bene￿t Policy Changes and Labour Supply Responses
New Labour came to power after the May 1997 general elections. Important tax-bene￿t
reforms were announced in the Pre-Budget Statement of November 1997 and implemented
in 1998 and 1999. Hence the period under investigation here coincides exactly with the
policy changes in the ￿rst term of the New Labour government. On the tax side, structural
policy changes included the abolition of the tax relief on mortgage interest, the introduc-
tion of a 10% lower rate and the reduction in the standard rate (from 23% to 22%) in the
income tax schedule, the switch from a trigger to a slice structure of Employers￿social
insurance contributions and the regular increase of council taxes above in￿ ation. Maybe
more important are the reforms of the welfare system, characterized by an increased gen-
erosity of income support for the elderly (now called ￿ minimum income guarantee￿ ) and for
families with children. The latter have also bene￿ted from the replacement of the family
credit by the more generous working family tax credit (WFTC) in 1999. In addition, a
non-refundable children￿ s tax credit has replaced the married couples allowance (except
for the elderly) and the additional personal allowance. Policy changes are described and
discussed in detail in Francesconi and Van der Klauuw (2004) or Hills et al. (2009).
As a matter of fact, some of the policy reforms under New Labour were aimed to
encourage employment of families with children, notably through the extension of tax
credits. The WFTC reform in particular has received a lot of attention. Both ex-ante
simulations (like Blundell et al., 2000) and ex-post evaluations (like Francesconi and Van
der Klauuw, 2004) agree on the strong incentive e⁄ects concerning single women and
single mothers in particular. At the same time, in-work transfers which are means-tested
on household income are known to discourage the participation of secondary earners. In
the case of the WFTC, Blundell et al. (2000) found a withdrawal of 20;000 married
women from the labour market and hence only moderate e⁄ects to the WFTC reform
overall.
Using the labour supply estimates on base-period and end-period data, we predict
the behavioural impact of the complete set of tax-bene￿t policy changes implemented by
the ￿rst New Labour government. The various reforms have a⁄ected work incentives in
opposite ways (for single parents, for instance, the WFTC has encouraged participation
but income support extensions may have had disincentive e⁄ects). Overall, our simulations
point to a marginal e⁄ect on men and a decrease in the participation of married women
of between 8;000 and 16;000. We also ￿nd an increase in the participation rate of single
women by 55;000 when using estimates obtained on base-period data (38;000 on end-
period data). Among those, 90% are single mothers and the participation rate of this
group increases by 3:3 points according to estimations on base-period data (2:3 on end-
9period data).12 Note however that simulated responses account only for a third (resp. a
quarter) of the increase in lone mothers￿mean working time (resp. participation rate) over
the period. Hence the transformations of the underlying population over time ￿which are
not modelled here ￿may lead to very di⁄erent evaluations of the policy e⁄ects between
decompositions I/III and II/IV. In particular, the change in the wage distribution may
have add a substantial e⁄ect on participation rates. This can be due to the economic
upturn of the period under consideration but also to the introduction of a minimum wage
in 1999 (aimed to limit the adverse e⁄ects of the WFTC, namely the possibility that
employers o⁄set the net gain of the transfer by lowering hourly wages) and its spillover
e⁄ects on wages above it.
3.3 Decomposition Analysis of Distributional E⁄ects
The various counterfactuals discussed in the theoretical section are reported in table 2
while the overall change in inequality/poverty, the homogeneity check and the decompo-
sition results are shown in table 3. We focus on the Shorrocks-Shapley decomposition and
compare it to decompositions I and II ￿the latter is of particular interest since the e⁄ect
of tax/transfer policy changes extracted from this base-period weighted decomposition is
the only measure available when looking at the impact of policy changes in prospect. Thus
we shall examine the sensitivity of the results with respect to base-period weighting.13
First of all, we test the homogeneity property by reporting in table 3 the di⁄erence
between I [d0(￿1p0;￿1y0))] and I [d0(p0;y0)], i.e., the di⁄erence between columns indexed
(0) and (1) in table 2. It is not signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero for all poverty/inequality
measures and con￿rms that the property holds. Then we compare the situation in base and
end periods as reported by columns (0) and (4). It turns out that changes in inequality
measures are not signi￿cant (Gini, percentile ratio, Atkinson with moderate inequality
aversion). We report the Reynolds-Smolensky index of redistribution, Gy ￿ Gd, and a
measure of vertical equity, Gy ￿ Cd, with Gy the Gini measure of equivalised market
income, Gd the Gini of equivalised disposable income and Cd the concentration measure
of equivalised disposable income.14 The measure of vertical equity signi￿cantly decreases
12Estimates are relatively precise for married couples but less so for single mothers. Bootstrapped
standard errors for that latter group give a con￿dence interval of the net e⁄ect of [30;000;65;000] on
base-period data ([20;000;50;000] on end-period data).
13Recall that direct policy e⁄ects under decompositions III and IV are identical to those under I and
II respectively.
14Note that we consider the complete e⁄ect of the tax-bene￿t system and not just the role of taxes as
often in measures of progressivity. The redistribution e⁄ect and the measure of vertical equity are in line
with Immervoll et al. (2006).
10over time. We ￿nd a signi￿cant decline in headcount poverty overall and a spectacular
drop amongst families with children and single parent households. The depth of poverty
tends to decrease but the reduction is statistically signi￿cant for child poverty only.
We decompose the contribution of each e⁄ect in explaining the overall trend. We
must keep in mind that the policy e⁄ect is evaluated against a distributionally neutral
backdrop whereby all tax-bene￿t monetary parameters, including welfare payment rates,
are adjusted by the mean income growth. Results point to a signi￿cant equalising e⁄ect
of policy changes in the UK over the period 1998-2001. For instance, without other
e⁄ects a⁄ecting the distribution, the Gini index would have decreased by 5% (1:5 points
￿in line with Clark and Leicester, 2004), the percentile ratio by 10% (0:4 points) and the
headcount poverty by 10% (1:7 points). The redistributive e⁄ect of the tax-bene￿t system
and the vertical equity measure would have increased by 8% and 7% respectively. In fact,
the substantial increase in market income inequality is just o⁄set by the redistributive
policies. The policy e⁄ect clearly dominates only in the case of headcount poverty. It is
especially strong for households with children and particularly single parent households.
It almost entirely explains the 30% drop in child poverty (headcount) and the 34% drop
in the intensity of child poverty (FGT1).
The labour supply e⁄ect is marginal for all the measures based on the entire population.
Yet it plays an important role for single parent households: the strong employment e⁄ect
of the policy reforms helps to lift single mothers above the poverty line and accounts for
around 30% of the total reduction in poverty for that group (2:3 points out of a 7:9 point
drop in headcount poverty). It also accounts for almost a half of the decrease in FGT1
(0:4 out of a 0:9 point reduction).
Finally, di⁄erences between methods are small (and not statistically signi￿cant). An
exception is the poverty headcount ratio for households with children and single parent
households. For these groups, decompositions II and IV attribute a larger role to the
policy impact. This possibly re￿ ects the stronger e⁄ect of the income support extensions
for families with children when evaluated using the base period when unemployment was
substantially higher. This result points to the need for caution when the structure of the
underlying population changes rapidly.
4 Conclusion
Relying on microsimulated counterfactual distributions, we decompose the time change
in inequality/poverty into three contributions: the direct impact of tax-bene￿t policy
changes, the distributional e⁄ect of behavioural responses to these policy reforms and the
11e⁄ect of all other factors (such as changes in market wage inequality). We rely on the
Shapley value method as reinterpreted by Shorrocks (1999), i.e., we average the marginal
contributions of each e⁄ect over the di⁄erent possible orderings. The method is applied
to inequality/poverty changes in the UK over the period 1998-2001. Results con￿rm
that the redistributive measures of the Labour government have reduced the increase in
inequality that would have occurred otherwise. Reforms like the extension of income
support and the WFTC have contributed to a signi￿cant drop in poverty among children
and in particular among single parent households, a group showing the highest risk of
poverty and social exclusion. Most interestingly, a third of the poverty reduction in the
latter group is attributed to the incentive e⁄ect of the reforms.
Most of the key results do not reveal a large sensitivity to the population at use to
evaluate policy changes, either the base-period data, the end-period data or an average
of these two contributions (the Shapley value method). This is reassuring for the many
analyses using the "base weighted" measure of policy impact as a ￿rst approximation, in
particular when evaluating budget propositions for coming years. Yet some di⁄erences
were observed in the case of the headcount ratio for families with children and single
parents (see similar ￿ndings for Ireland in Bargain and Callan, 2008). Hence caution is
required when transformations in the underlying population are important or a⁄ect the
groups particularly concerned by redistributive policies.
Several limitations of the present study should also motivate further research. In par-
ticular, we account only for the direct redistributive e⁄ect of policy changes and potential
labour supply responses. Even if more di¢ cult, it is potentially important to account for
general equilibrium e⁄ects (see Bhattarai and Whalley, 2008) or at least for the interaction
of supply and demand on the labour market (see Peichl and Siegloch, 2010). Other mar-
gins than labour supply, like work e⁄ort, tax evasion or bene￿t take-up are not addressed
in the present framework. Some of the other behavioural responses may be captured in a
more comprehensive way by studying the change in taxable (or means-tested) income (see
for instance Thoresen, 2004). Finally, we have considered the distribution of equivalised
household disposable income as a proxy of individual welfare. More general, possibly
utility-based, measures could be used (see Capeau et al., 2008, for a recent application of
alternative welfare measures and a review of existing methods).
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15Table 1: Labour Supply Estimations: Fit and Elasticities
male female male female
Nb of observations 740 424 774 442
Log-Likelihood -703 -477 -786 -482
pseudo-R2 0.31 0.19 0.27 0.21
Error on participation* 0.2 0.6 1.2 0.2 0.2 0.7 1.8 0.1












Extensive margin  [0.20,0.30] [0.09,0.12] [0.19,0.45]  [0.34,0.57] [0.08,0.18] [0.04,0.07] [0.12,0.33] [0.17,0.37]
















* Prediction errors correspond to (i) the absolute deviation between predicted and observed participation rates (in percentage points), (ii) the relative deviation
between  predicted  and  observed  mean  hours.
** Elasticities are calculated by predicting the impact of a 1% wage increase on participation (extensive margin) and average worked hours (intensive margin).




16Table 2: Counterfactual Simulations
data year: 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1
uprated to: 1 1 1 1
with labour supply: 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
policy year: 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
uprated to: 1 1 1 1
(0) (1) (1*) (2*) (2) (3) (3*) (4*) (4)
Inequality
Gini 31.2 31.2 31.2 32.8 32.9 29.6 29.6 31.5 31.5
(0.3) (0.3) (0.3) (0.5) (0.5) (0.3) (0.3) (0.5) (0.5)
Atkinson 0.5 7.8 7.8 7.8 8.7 8.8 7.0 7.0 8.1 8.1
(0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2)
Atkinson 1 16.5 16.5 16.5 18.7 18.7 15.0 15.0 17.3 17.4
(0.3) (0.3) (0.3) (0.5) (0.5) (0.3) (0.3) (0.4) (0.4)
P90/P10 4.1 4.1 4.1 4.4 4.4 3.7 3.7 4.0 4.0
(0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1)
Redistribution effect 18.8 18.8 18.8 16.8 16.7 20.4 20.4 18.1 18.0
(0.3) (0.3) (0.3) (0.3) (0.3) (0.3) (0.3) (0.3) (0.3)
Vertical equity 20.6 20.6 20.8 18.5 18.3 22.1 22.4 19.7 19.6
(0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2)
Poverty
FGT0 (%) 17.3 17.3 17.0 18.2 18.0 14.6 14.4 15.6 15.5
(0.5) (0.5) (0.5) (0.5) (0.5) (0.4) (0.4) (0.5) (0.5)
FGT1 (%) 3.1 3.1 3.0 3.7 3.7 2.5 2.4 3.1 3.0
(0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1)
FGT2 (%) 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.3 1.3 0.8 0.8 1.1 1.1
(0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1)
Child poverty
FGT0 (%) 24.5 24.5 24.2 23.5 23.7 17.3 16.9 17.4 17.7
(1.0) (1.0) (1.0) (1.0) (1.0) (0.9) (0.8) (0.9) (0.9)
FGT1 (%) 3.8 3.8 3.7 4.1 4.1 2.3 2.2 2.5 2.5
(0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2)
FGT2 (%) 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.6
(0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1)
Single parents
FGT0 (%) 43.8 43.8 40.4 43.5 42.0 32.8 29.9 37.4 36.0
(2.5) (2.5) (2.5) (2.5) (2.5) (2.3) (2.3) (2.5) (2.5)
FGT1 (%) 5.6 5.6 5.1 7.4 7.0 2.9 2.6 5.0 4.8
(0.5) (0.5) (0.5) (0.6) (0.6) (0.4) (0.4) (0.5) (0.5)
FGT2 (%) 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.8 1.7 0.6 0.5 1.2 1.1
(0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2)
Note: Measures are based on equivalised income using the modified OECD scale. The poverty line is 60% median equivalised income. Gini, Atkinson index and FGT poverty
measures are multiplied by 100. The Reynolds-Smolensky redistribution effect and the vertical equity measure are calculated as Gy - Gd and Gy - Cd respectively, with Gy the Gini
of pre-tax/benefit equivalized income, Gd the Gini of post-tax/benefit equivalized income and Cd the concentration measure of post-tax/benefit equivalized income. Period 0 is
1998 and period 1 is 2001. Scenario 1* and 3* (resp. 2* and 4*) are counterfactuals on data 0 (resp. 1) with labour supply responses to system of year 0 (resp. 1). Bootstrapped
standard errors are indicated in brackets.
17Table 3: Decomposing Changes in Income Distribution over Time
(4)-(0) (1)-(0) (4)-(2) (1*)-(1) (2)-(1*) (3)-(1) (3*)-(3) (4)-(3*)
Inequality
Gini 0.3 0.0 -1.5 0.0 1.8 -1.3 0.0 1.7 -1.6 0.0 1.9
(0.6) (0.5) (0.0) (0.0) (0.6) (0.0) (0.0) (0.6) (0.0) (0.0) (0.6)
Atkinson 0.5 0.3 0.0 -0.7 0.0 1.0 -0.7 0.0 1.0 -0.7 0.0 1.1
(0.3) (0.3) (0.3) (0.3) (0.3) (0.3) (0.3) (0.3) (0.3) (0.2) (0.3)
Atkinson 1 0.9 0.0 -1.4 0.0 2.3 -1.4 0.0 2.2 -1.5 0.0 2.4
(0.5) (0.4) (0.5) (0.4) (0.5) (0.6) (0.4) (0.5) (0.4) (0.4) (0.5)
P90/P10 -0.1 0.0 -0.4 0.0 0.3 -0.4 0.0 0.3 -0.4 0.0 0.3
(0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1)
Redistribution effect -0.8 0.0 1.5 0.0 -2.2 1.3 0.0 -2.1 1.6 0.0 -2.4
(0.5) (0.5) (0.5) (0.5) (0.5) (0.5) (0.5) (0.5) (0.5) (0.5) (0.5)
Vertical equity -1.0 0.0 1.4 0.0 -2.5 1.3 0.2 -2.5 1.6 0.2 -2.8
(0.3) (0.3) (0.3) (0.3) (0.3) (0.3) (0.3) (0.3) (0.3) (0.3) (0.3)
Poverty
FGT0 (%) -1.7 0.0 -2.6 -0.2 1.1 -2.5 -0.2 1.0 -2.6 -0.2 1.1
(0.7) (0.7) (0.2) (0.1) (0.7) (0.2) (0.1) (0.7) (0.2) (0.1) (0.6)
FGT1 (%) -0.01 0.0 -0.6 -0.1 0.7 -0.6 -0.1 0.7 -0.6 -0.1 0.7
(0.2) (0.2) (0.0) (0.0) (0.2) (0.0) (0.0) (0.2) (0.0) (0.0) (0.2)
FGT2 (%) 0.1 0.0 -0.2 0.0 0.3 -0.2 0.0 0.4 -0.1 0.0 0.3
(0.1) (0.1) (0.0) (0.0) (0.1) (0.0) (0.0) (0.1) (0.0) (0.0) (0.1)
Child poverty
FGT0 (%) -6.8 0.0 -6.6 -0.1 -0.1 -6.0 -0.2 -0.6 -7.1 -0.4 0.8
(1.3) (1.4) (0.6) (0.2) (1.3) (0.6) (0.3) (1.4) (0.6) (0.2) (1.2)
FGT1 (%) -1.3 0.0 -1.5 0.0 0.3 -1.6 -0.1 0.4 -1.5 -0.1 0.3
(0.3) (0.3) (0.1) (0.1) (0.3) (0.1) (0.1) (0.3) (0.1) (0.1) (0.2)
FGT2 (%) -0.4 0.0 -0.4 0.0 0.0 -0.4 0.0 0.0 -0.4 0.0 0.0
(0.1) (0.1) (0.0) (0.0) (0.1) (0.0) (0.0) (0.1) (0.0) (0.0) (0.1)
Single parents
FGT0 (%) -7.9 0.0 -8.6 -2.3 3.7 -6.1 -3.5 1.6 -11.1 -2.9 6.0
(3.5) (3.5) (1.5) (0.6) (3.4) (1.3) (0.6) (3.5) (1.7) (0.6) (3.4)
FGT1 (%) -0.9 0.0 -2.5 -0.4 2.1 -2.2 -0.5 1.9 -2.7 -0.4 2.2
(0.7) (0.7) (0.2) (0.1) (0.7) (0.2) (0.1) (0.7) (0.2) (0.0) (0.6)
FGT2 (%) 0.0 0.0 -0.6 -0.1 0.7 -0.6 -0.1 0.7 -0.5 -0.1 0.6











Shapley Decomposition Decomposition I
Note: Period 0 is 1998 and period 1 is 2001. Policy effects in decompositions III and IV (not reported) are identical to those in decompositions I and II respectively. The policy effect under the
Shapley value decomposition is the average of (4)-(2) and (3)-(1). The behavioural effect is the average of (1*)-(1), (3*)-(3), (2)-(2*) and (4)-(4*). Bootstrapped standard errors are indicated in
brackets.
Other
effects
Policy
effect
Policy
effect
Other
effects
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response
Decomposition II
Policy
effect
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